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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Michael Winegar appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence
of a child and misdemeanor destruction of a telecommunication device.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2013, Winegar and Angela Phelps, his girlfriend of 10 years,
were moving personal property to their new residence in Eagle with their twoyear-old daughter, N.W. (Trial Tr., p.117, L.16- p.118, L.24; p.120, L.17- p.122,
L.5.) Winegar and Phelps were arguing during the day. (Trial Tr., p. 122, L.21 p.125, L.8.) At some point, after the argument intensified and Winegar made
physical threats towards Phelps, Phelps took N.W. and tried to leave the area in
her truck. (Trial Tr., p.124, L.11 - p.126, L.25.)
Winegar followed Phelps to the truck and tried to grab the keys out of the
truck's ignition. (Trial Tr., p.127, Ls.11-16.) Phelps told Winegar that she was
going to call the police, and Winegar took Phelps' phone from her.

(Trial Tr.,

p.127, Ls.11-22.) Then, Winegar punched Phelps several times. (Trial Tr., p.127,
L.23 - p.128, L.1.) Winegar also grabbed Phelps by her neck, pulled her out of
the truck, and dragged her behind the house. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.8-20.) Phelps
could "barely" breathe when Winegar's arm was on her neck. (Trial Tr., p.129,
Ls.21-25.)
Winegar's mother, who pulled up in her vehicle during the attack,
intervened and was able to calm Winegar down.
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(Trial Tr., p.128, Ls.15-25;

p.130, L.19 - p.131, L.2.)

'
Phelps took this opportunity to grab N.W. and run

down the street. (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.8-10.) Phelps flagged down a motorist who
was driving by.

(Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.11-13.)

Phelps entered the motorist's car

while Winegar chased her down the street. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.25 - p.132, L.4.)
Phelps asked the motorist to drive her to a friend's house.

(Trial Tr., p.132,

Ls.10-14.) There, the friend encouraged Phelps to go to the hospital. (Trial Tr.,
p.132, Ls.10-20.)
At the hospital, the treating physician noted contusions and abrasions on
Phelps' chest, right upper extremity, right side of her neck, and left ankle. (Trial
Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.229, L.16.)

Phelps was then taken to the FACES Family

Advocacy Center in Boise. (Trial Tr., p.336, Ls.8-18.) There, a nurse conducted
a forensic examination on Phelps, during which the nurse noted the abrasions on
Phelps' body and documented 17 specific injuries. (Trial Tr., p.263, L.3 - p.264,
L.21; p.267, L.23 - p.268, L.8; p.271, L.1 - p.273, L.19; see also State's Exhibits
1-43.)
A grand jury indicted Winegar on charges of felony domestic battery in the
presence of a child, attempted strangulation, and misdemeanor destruction of a
telecommunication device. (R., pp.26-27.) Shortly before trial, the state filed an
amended information which omitted the attempted strangulation charge. (R.,
pp.81-82; Trial Tr., p.8, Ls.7-20.) A jury found Winegar guilty of the other two
charges. (R., pp.136-137; Trial Tr., p.575, L.8 - p.576, L.11.) Citing Winegar's
prior history of domestic violence and a domestic violence evaluation which
concluded that Winegar was a high risk to re-offend, the district court imposed a

2

unified 10-year sentence with two and one-half years fixed for felony domestic
battery in the presence of a child, and 120 days in jail for destruction of a
telecommunication device. (R., pp.195-200; 7/30/14 Tr., p.44, L.8 - p.47, L.14.)
Winegar timely appealed. (R., pp.202-205.)
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ISSUE
Winegar states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court commit reversible error by admitting
testimony regarding unrelated bad acts of Mr. Winegar, in violation
of Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Did Winegar fail to preserve his claim that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of Winegar's prior battery perpetrated on Angela Phelps?
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ARGUMENT
Winegar Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court Erred By Admitting
Evidence Of Winegar's Prior Battery Perpetrated On Angela Phelps
A.

Introduction
Winegar contends that the district court erred by permitting the state to

introduce evidence that Winegar battered Phelps the day prior to the incident
which led to his arrest in this case. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Winegar waived
this claim because he failed to preserve it for appeal.

Even if Winegar had

preserved this claim, he has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused
its discretion.

Finally, even if the district court did err, any such error was

harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted).

C.

Winegar Waived His Evidentiary Claim By Failing To Preserve It
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time

on appeal.

State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1991).

Further, "[a]n objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different
basis for excluding the evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885,
119 P.3d at 660, 653 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880,
11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000)).
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Additionally, before an appellant may assert an issue on appeal, he must
obtain an adverse ruling on that issue from the trial court. State v. Fisher, 123
Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) ("We will not review a trial court's
alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which
forms the basis for the assignment of error."); State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580,
584-586, 199 P.3d 155, 159-161 (Ct. App. 2008) (declining to address merits of
Huntsman's claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, where the Court found
the issue was not preserved due to a failure of counsel to obtain a ruling on
motion to dismiss).
In this case, prior to trial, Winegar filed a motion requesting that the court
permit him to cross-examine Phelps about her methamphetamine use.

(R.,

pp.72-73.) In the motion, Winegar asserted that he and Phelps had argued about
her methamphetamine use prior to the incident which led to Winegar's arrest.
(Id.) At a subsequent hearing, the district court stated that it had met with the
parties off the record for "quite some time" to discuss this and other pretrial
issues.

(4/24/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-10.) With regard to Winegar's motion to permit

cross-examination of Phelps on her methamphetamine use and their argument
on the day of the incident, the court stated:
And it is my view that what occurred that day would be relevant.
And so at this point I think both counsel have been made aware that if
there were arguments that day, what the contents of those arguments
are about becomes relevant to the trial in this matter.
At the same time I'm not going to allow in what occurred a week
before or days before or months before, because I'm concerned about
confusion to the jury in trying to keep the trial moving on what the
relevant issues are in the case, and that's whether there was criminal
conduct on the part of Mr. Winegar on the day in question.
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(4/24/14 Tr., p.7, L.15 - p.8, L.3.) Winegar did not object to this ruling.
At trial, consistent with this pretrial ruling, the state questioned Phelps
about the argument she had with Winegar on the day of the incident.

The

following exchange occurred:
State:

How were things going that day?

Phelps:

That day, not good.

State:

Were you arguing?

Phelps:

Very much so.

State:

What sort of things were you arguing about?

Phelps:

What he had did [sic] to me the night before.

State:

What had he done to you the night before?

Defense Counsel:

Your Honor, I would object. Can we approach?

Court:

You may.

(Trial Tr., p.122, L.21 - p.123, L.6.)
Neither the court nor the parties summarized the content of the
subsequent bench conference.

Following the bench conference, the court did

not rule on Winegar's objection. (See Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.6-9.) Instead, the state
resumed its previous line of questioning:
State:

Your Honor, would you like me to ask the
question again[?]

Court:

Yes, go ahead.

State:

Okay. And what had happened the night before?

Phelps:

He wanted to have sex and I didn't, and so it
became very, very forceful.
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State:

Okay. And the next day, were you upset about
that?

Phelps:

I was liv[id]. He's supposed to --

(Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.7-16.)
Through subsequent questioning, the prosecutor elicited testimony that
linked the argument between Winegar and Phelps, and Winegar's prior conduct,
to the growing tension that ultimately led to Winegar's attack on Phelps:
State:

That's okay. As the next day went on, October
30 th , was he doing anything in particular that
was upsetting you?

Phelps:

He threw my daughter['s] nebulizer machine
out on the ground of the -- the thing we were
staying in, and then he threw some of my
personal belongings out there as well and he
ran my stuff over, but her machine didn't get
hurt because I had picked it up.

State:

Okay.
Was he attempting to touch you
physically?

Phelps:

Was he attempting to at the time?

State:

Yes.

Phelps:

No, not at that time.

State:

Was he attempting to kiss you or hug you?

Phelps:

Oh yes. He was doing that and making jokes,
and I wasn't in the mood for it. I was very
upset.

State:

Were you upset because
happened the previous night?

Phelps:

Yes, ma'am.

State:

As the day went on, was he making any
threats to you?
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of

what

had

Phelps:

I'm going to change the words, he was --

State:

You don't have to --

Phelps:

-- he was telling me how he was going to beat me up
that day, he could feel it coming.

(Trial Tr., p.123, L.17-p.124, L.16.)
Winegar failed to preserve his objection to this testimony because he
failed to obtain an adverse ruling on his objection from the district court. There is
no indication in the record that Winegar attempted to obtain such a ruling after he
made his objection, or that the court did anything to prevent or dissuade Winegar
from doing so. Without such a ruling from the district court, this Court cannot
entertain the issue. From the context of the record, it is possible that Winegar
withdrew his objection during the bench conference, or invited the error he now
alleges.

This Court cannot conclude that Winegar preserved the issue based

upon speculation or supposition as to what may have occurred during a bench
conference at which no record was made. See Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho
792, 795, 874 P.2d 603, 606 (Ct. App.1994) ("It is axiomatic that an appellant
bears the burden of providing an adequate record to substantiate his or her
claims before the appellate court.") (citation omitted).
Winegar also failed to preserve the issue by failing to provide a specific
ground for his objection. For an objection to be preserved for appellate review,
either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of
the objection must be apparent from the context. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003); I.R.E. 103(a)(1). In this case, it is not clear
from the record what the specific basis of Winegar's objection was. Notably, on
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appeal, Winegar does not attempt to identify the specific basis of the objection,
and instead asserts that the admission of Phelps' testimony regarding Winegar's
prior conduct violated Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404.

1

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.)
Because he failed to preserve his claim that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of Winegar's prior conduct, this Court should not entertain this
issue on appeal. The Court should therefore affirm Winegar's conviction.

D.

In The Alternative, Winegar Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion
Even if he had preserved this claim for appeal, Winegar has failed to show

that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Phelps' testimony.

For

many of the same reasons discussed above in the context of the state's
argument that the issue is not preserved, it is difficult to analyze the merits of
Winegar's claims on appeal. Winegar failed to create an adequate record or
obtain a ruling regarding what his specific objection to the evidence was, what
the court's rationale was for permitting the testimony, or what considerations went
into this determination. As a result, Winegar cannot demonstrate, on this record,
that the district court abused its discretion.
Winegar asserts that the district court should have excluded Phelps'
testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant, and that any probative value of
the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

In the event that this Court determines that Winegar's objection preserved
some issue for appeal, it should not find that Winegar's single unspecified
objection preserved all of the grounds he now asserts on appeal.
1
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(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. l.R.E.
401, 402. Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in
the case, and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable
than it would be without the evidence, is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544,
547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).

Even if relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403.
In this case, Phelps' testimony was relevant and substantially probative.
The growing tension between Phelps and Winegar, and the nature of their
argument, demonstrated both Phelps' state of mind and motive in fleeing from
Winegar to the truck, and Winegar's state of mind and motive to pursue and
eventually batter Phelps. Further, it is clear from Winegar's pretrial motion and
opening statement that he intended to introduce evidence regarding the content
of the argument, and to assert that he was attempting to protect N.W. when he
confronted Phelps at the truck. (See R., pp.72-73; Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.3-18.) The
state was entitled to challenge this theory of the case with testimony from Phelps
regarding her recollections of the same argument, and of Winegar's increasing
hostility towards Phelps which ultimately culminated in the attack.

For similar

reasons, the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Winegar. Therefore, even if
he had preserved this issue, Winegar has failed to demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion in concluding that the testimony was relevant, or that
its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
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Winegar also asserts that the district court should have excluded Phelps'
testimony on the ground that it was intended to demonstrate Winegar's criminal
propensity in violation of I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Under l.R.E.
404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993).
As long as the evidence is relevant to prove some issue other than the
defendant's character and its probative value for the proper purpose is not
substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to
admit it. State v. Cross. 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
As discussed above, it is clear even from the limited record in this case
that Phelps' testimony in question was relevant for purposes other than
demonstrating criminal propensity. Specifically, the testimony at issue tended to
demonstrate Phelps' motive and state of mind that resulted in her fleeing to her
truck, and Winegar's motive, intent, and state of mind leading up to the attack.
Finally, even if Winegar had demonstrated that the district court erred, any
such error was harmless.

"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which

admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... "
I.R.E. 103(a).

See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence."
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State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).
In this case, even if the district court erred, any such error was harmless
because the evidence of Winegar's guilt was overwhelming. Trial testimony of
the emergency room physician, FACES nurse, police officers who responded to
the hospital to investigate the incident, and the motorist who drove Phelps away
from the scene of the incident all corroborated Phelps' testimony. (See generally
Trial Tr.)

Further, Michael Amelia, Winegar's best friend for over 15 years,

testified that following the incident, Winegar came to his residence and told him
that he had gotten "a little rough" with Phelps and had punched her and pulled
her out of the vehicle.

(Trial Tr., p.412, L.14 - p.415, L.21.)

Finally, in a

telephone conversation with his mother that was recorded and admitted into
evidence, Winegar stated that the incident was not Phelps' fault, and was instead
a result of Winegar being off of his medications. (State's Exhibit 52, 0:50-3: 1O;
Trial Tr., p.442, L.21 - p.444, L.8.) In light of this evidence which corroborated
Phelps' testimony, a rational jury would have found Winegar guilty of the charged
crimes even without the admission of Phelps' testimony regarding Winegar's prior
conduct. Therefore, any district court error in the admission of that evidence is
harmless.
Winegar failed to preserve his claim that the district court erred by
permitting the state to elicit testimony about Winegar's prior conduct. Even had
Winegar preserved this claim, he has failed to demonstrate that the district court
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abused its discretion. Finally, even if the district court did err, any such error was
harmless. This Court should therefore affirm Winegar's convictions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Winegar guilty of felony domestic
battery in the presence of a child and misdemeanor destruction of a
telecommunication device.
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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